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Abstract

In this paper, we extend the bank run literature to an open economy
model.

We show that a foreign banking system, by raising deposit rates in the

presence of a domestic banking panic, may generate sufficient liquid resources
to acquire assets sold by the domestic banking system at bargain prices.
this case, foreign depositors will benefit from the domestic panic.

In

We also

show that our simple model is able to generate the spreading of panics.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the crucial element in determining the propagation
of financial crises is the effect of interest rates on savings decisions.

1.

Introduction
Recent models of systematic bank runs [Diamond and Dybvig (1982), Waldo

(1985)] have been set in the context of a closed economy.

The important

banking collapses of the previous century and of the first third of this
century, however, occurred in an environment marked by financial openness and
by the operation of a gold standard.

Foreign holders of liquid gold reserves

could therefore ship them to a country experiencing a banking panic and
benefit from an opportunity to acquire assets cheaply, provided that they were
themselves confident that the panic would not spread to their own banking
system.
In this paper, we extend the bank run literature to an open economy
model.

We show that a foreign banking system, by raising deposit rates in the

presence of a domestic banking panic, may generate sufficient liquid resources
to acquire assets sold by the domestic banking system at bargain prices.
this case, foreign depositors will benefit from the domestic panic.

In

Another

important reason for studying bank runs in an open economy framework, is that
financial crises and panics are frequently international phenomena:

"

financial crises tend to be international, either running parallel from
country to country or spreading by one means or another from the centers where
they originate to other countries" (Kindleberger (1978) p. 118).
that our simple model is able to generate the spreading of panics.

We will show
Perhaps

not surprisingly, the crucial element in determining the propagation of
financial crises is the effect of interest rates on savings decisions.
We divide the paper into three sections.

In section 1, we present a

2

two-country banking model and examine its equilibrium in the absence of bank
runs.

In section 2 we study the international equilibrium that would arise

with a bank run in the domestic country.

1'.

Section 3 contains conclusions.

The Model and its No-Run Equilibrium
In this section, we describe a simple three-period economy with financial

intermediaries in many ways similar to previous models, especially that of
Waldo (1985).

Whereas previous analyses of bank runs were confined to closed

economies, we examine a two-country setting.
The domestic economy is comprised of an infinite number of identical
individuals who live for three periods and have preferences given by:

People consume only in periods one and two.

In period zero, they receive an

endowment E, identical for all individuals.
0
In the economy, three different ways exist to transfer wealth over time:
storage with no depreciation, short term (one-period) investment with a payoff
r , and long term (two-period) investment with payoff r .
1
2
parametric.

We will assume that r

access to investment technology.

2

> r 12

The payoffs are

Individuals do not have direct

Because of indivisibilities (not modelled)

in the size of investment projects, they must pool their resources to invest
in a short or long term project.

Such a pooling institution could be either a

bank or a mutual fund.
Previous papers, i.e. Diamond-Dybvig (1983) and Waldo (1985), assume the
presence of unobservable, idiosynchratic shocks which generate liquidity needs
in the first period to justify the existence of banks which provide demand
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deposit arrangements.

The addition of this assumption would not change our

conclusions in any important way.

Since the focus of the paper lies in

another direction, we simplify the analysis by ignoring this kind of shock.
We assume directly that banks providing demand deposits prevail in the
society.

We allow the presence of a securities market, but only for large

players as in Waldo.

1

We assume that the foreign country is a mirror image of the domestic
country:

it has identical preferences, technology, endowments, and financial

institutions.

Any equilibrium with no bank runs will be characterized by the

absence of trade between the two countries.
The budget constraints for the representative agent in the domestic
economy are given by: 2

s

+ DD

+ FD

Period 1:

E

Period 2:

+ i DW + i * FW = s + DD + FD + c1
1
1
1
1
1
*
*
sl + i 2 (DD 0 -DW) + i 2 (FD 0 -FW) + i 1 DD 1 + i 1FD 1 = C2

Period 3:

0

s

0

0

0

0

where:

1
Diamond and Dybvig implicitly assume the absence of securities markets in
the presence of the sorts of contracts offered by their banks.

Budget constraints for foreign individuals are identical.
asterisk(*) to represent foreign variables and parameters.
2

Simply add an

4

E

period zero endowment.

S

storage from period zero to period one

0

0

s1

storage from period one to period two

DD.
J

deposits in domestic banks at period j

FD.
J

deposits in foreign banks at period j

DW

withdrawals from domestic deposits in period one

FW

withdrawals from foreign deposits in period 1

C.
J

consumption in period j

i

payoff on one unit of demand deposits held for one period

i

1
2

payoff on demand deposits held for two periods.

Moreover, since foreign banks have access to the same linear technology,
This model will have a multiplicity of equilibria due to
the indeterminacy of the division between domestic and foreign investment
arising from the identical, constant return technology.

We resolve this

indeterminacy by assuming that, given identical returns, individuals will
choose deposits in banks in their own countries.
The maximization problem therefore simplifies to

3

Alternatively, we could assume that there is a single bank aiming to
maximize consumer welfare.
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s.t. E

~

0

S + DD
0

so+ rlDW

~

(>. )
0

0

(>.l)

sl + DDl + cl

sl + r2(DDO - DW) + rlDDl

~

c2

(>.2)

>.. is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to period j budget constraint.
J

The first order conditions for this problem are:

Cl

u' (Cl) = >.l

c2

{JU, ( C2) = >.2

s

So [>.l

0

DD

).
0

- >. 0 l

0

r2>.2

0

DW

rl>.l = r2>.2

Sl

Sl [ >-2 - >-1 l = 0

DD

2

DDl[>.l - rl>.2] = 0.

In equilibrium, S

0

dominated by DD

0

,

s , and DD will be zero, since these investments are
1
1

and (DD

0

- DW).

Formally, in addition, we must consider the

bank solvency constraints:

where SI. are the short term assets purchased by the bank at time j and LI
J

are the long term assets purchased at time zero.

0
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The equilibrium is such that the bank will invest DW in short term
securities and (E

0

- DW) in long term securities.

(Recall that DD

0

E

0

in

equilibrium .)

Example:

Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility Function

Suppose that U(C.) =
J

-Q

Cl

Cl
-Q

c2
DD

0

= ).

= ).

r

= >.o/>.l

2

DW

r2/rl = >.l/A2

).

E

0

0

= DD

J

1

f3C2

2

c. 1 - 0 /[l - a].

0

).1

rlDW = cl

).2

r (DD - DW)
2
0

c2

Using these conditions, we find that

As expected dDW/dr

1

> 0, and dDW/dr

2

< 0.

The first order conditions are then:
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Specificall y, if~~ l, a= .5, r 1 - 1.05, and r 2 = 1.15, equilibrium
allocations are:

0.48 E

0

0.50 E

0

0.60 E

0

2.

Equilibrium with Bank Runs

This type of model can support equilibria with self-fulfill ing panics,
i.e. bank runs that are triggered by events exogenous to the model's
fundamental s.

Also, fundamental insolvencie s may generate bank runs.

After allocations have been decided in period O on the basis of
predicting no runs, depositors can self-genera te a run in period one by
suddenly believing that other depositors will withdraw the entire amount in
their accounts from the bank.
This kind of scenario is similar to one described by Waldo (1985) for a
closed economy.

Waldo completes his model by assuming that agents in period 0

believe that the probability is~ that such a panic will occur in period one.
This probability , however, is exogenous in Waldo's model, and we choose to
assume here that it equals zero.

The operational difference is that, if ~>0,

depositors will invest part of their endowments in storage to protect against
the possibility of not beating the run.
change accordingly .

Equilibrium deposits in period O will

Whether or not individuals use storage technology will
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not affect the thrust of our argumen t.

For simplic ity, therefor e, we assume

that the exogenou s event that could trigger a bank run in period one is
complet ely unexpec ted as of period zero.
The experim ent that we will consider is that of a panic occuring only in
the home country; foreign banks are not subject to panic runs.

When the panic

occurs in period one, agents will demand the immedia te redempt ion of all their
deposits (DD).
0

We will assume that domestic agents, after withdraw ing their

deposits , will use storage technolo gy (hoardin g) to transfer goods to the
second period.
r DD = r E
1 0
1 0

Solvency of the domestic banks requires that the bank pay out

Since the liquid assets of the banks only amount to r SI ,
1 0
banks must liquida te their long term securiti es LI . The only potentia l
.

0

buyers are banks in the foreign country.
Foreign banks can acquire resource s to purchase the securiti es by
inducing their deposito rs to consume and withdraw less in period one.

The

foreign bank will offer its deposito rs a new contrac tual arrangem ent.
Individu als can still withdraw in period one and collect the payoff i . The
1
payoff on deposits not withdraw n in period one, however , is changed to i .
2
(The(') represe nts foreign bank payoffs in the presence of a panic in the
domestic banking system.]
as of period one will be:

r DW*

1

The maximiz ation problem of the foreign individu al
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The first order conditions are:
Cl*

U'(C *)=A
1
1

C2*

~U'(C *)=A
2
2

DW*

i 2 '/r

1 = Al/A 2

i ' will be determined by the equilibrium condition:
2

Consumption in the second period must equal the world output of the long-term
investment.

Self-Justification of Panics

As is common in the bank panic literature, we can demonstrate that a bank
panic in the domestic country is self-justifying.

Domestic banks are assumed

to pay out funds to their depositors on a first come - first served basis
until they exhaust their assets.
Proposition 1:
Proof:

If a run occurs, the banking system is insolvent.

Note first that for the domestic banking system to be solvent, it

must be able to sell period two securities for at least r LI which implies
1 0
that foreign consumption in period one should drop to r (SI -LI).

1

0

0

In this

case, the rate of return that the foreign bank can pay on deposits not
withdrawn in period one is i
property LI
r SI * •
1 0

0

=

LI * .
0

2r LI
2 0
= r , where we used the symmetry
2
2LI

2

But at r

0

2

it was optimal for the foreign agent to consume

In order to induce a reduction in period one consumption, it is
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necessary that i

2

> r , which implies that domestic banks will be unable to
2

receive r LI in exchange for their long term securitie s.
1 0

The domestic banks
,
are then bankrupt and the run is self-just ifying. (Notice that i < r is not
2
2
a possibili ty, since in this case the foreign country would be made worse off
by purchasin g securitie s from the domestic country).

Example:

Panic Equilibriu m with a Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility

Function

In this case the first order condition s for the foreign country are:

*
Cl
*
c2
DW*
*
Al
*
A2

*-a
Cl
= Al
*-a
pc2 = A2
i2'/rl = Al/A2
r DW* = C*
1
1
*
i2'(Eo - DW)

c2*

To derive the explicit solution for this problem we first take i

1

2

as given.

The solution' s form is then analogous to that of the previous case, with i
substitut ed for r :
2

ow*= [rl (1-a)/aEo ] / [ rl (1-a)/a + bl/ai2'(l -a)/a]
C~

[rll/aEo] / [rl (1-a)/a+ pl/ai2, (1-a)/a]

c;

[pl/ai, 1/a Eo] / [rl (1-a)/a + pl/ai ,(l-a)/a] .
2
2

(l)

1

2
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The next step is to find the equilibrium i 2 .

To do this, we use the

equilibrium condition:

c*2 - 2r 2 (E 0

!lli.)

-

(2)

where DW is given by period zero decisions when no bank runs were expected,
i.e.

Substituting (3) into (2) and equating the result to (1) yields an
expression in i 2 ' as a function of r 1 , r 2 , a, and {3:
. , 1/a[ (1-a)/a +
rl
12

,(1-a)/a]
2 r2 1/a[ rl (1-a)/a + ~al/a.12
i:il/a

~

r2

(1-a)/a]

.

Solving this non-linear expression provides the equilibrium i 2 ' which we can
* c* , and c* .
use to derive DW,
2
1
Assuming a= .5, this expression reduces to a second order equation,
whose positive root is:

If we substitute the same values used in the previous example, i.e. f3
1, r

1

= 1.05, r

i2

,

DW*
*
Cl
*
c2

:::::

1.875

:::::

0.36E

:::::

= 1.15, we obtain:

2

0

1.05 DW* = 0. 38 E

0

:::::

1.875 (E

0

- DW*)

= 1.2 E

0
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The amount paid by foreign banks for the domestic securities is given by
the difference between the levels of foreign, first period consumption with
and without bank runs:
0.12E.
0

The liquidity needs of the domestic bank were r E = 1.0SE.
1 0
0
derived from short term investment is .SE.
0

The goods acquired as a result of

long term security liquidation amount to .12E.
0

liquidated assets of .62E

The liquidity

Therefore, the total

fall short of the claims against the banks.

0

The

bank run produces the bankrupt~y of the domestic banking system.
The result of a bank run in the domestic country is a redistribution of
wealth from the domestic to the foreign country.

As a result of the domestic

panic, the total utility of the representative foreign agent has increased to

uR*

= 2[0.38E ]·S + 2[1.2E ]·S while it was only
0

0

Jill-*=

2[.SE ]•
0

5

+ 2[.6E ]- 5
0

with no run in the domestic banking system.
Finally, this simple model predicts that, at the time of the bank run,
the domestic country will experience a deficit in the trade balance, financed
by exports of long-term assets.

In the next period, it will have a surplus in

its trade balance and a fall in national product below the no-run level.
Also, the foreign country will experience an increase in the interest rate.

The International Transmission of Panics

In the event of a domestic bank run, we have assumed above that a
positive flow of goods will be forthcoming from the foreign country in
exchange for long term securities.

The acquisition of long term securities,
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however, will favorably change the intertemporal budget constraint facing the
typical resident of the foreign country.

Under the circumstances of increased

wealth, foreign depositors may in fact choose to increase their period one
consumption beyond their previous plans.

Since foreign banks lack sufficient

liquidity to meet the implied withdrawals, the apparently favorable
opportunity available to the foreign country can lead to a run on the foreign
banking system.

In this section we consider the conditions under which this

case may arise.
Since all domestic long-term securities are sold to the foreign banking
system, the amount of period two goods available to the typical foreign
resident will double.

To encourage foreign residents to give up claims on

some of the consumption that they had planned for period one, the foreign
banking system raises the yield on deposits between period one and period two
to i '/r > r /r .
1
2
2 1

In Figure 1, this change is diagrammed as a shift from

budget line 1 to budget line 2, as perceived by the typical household.
Since the foreign banking system's holdings of long term bonds will
double, we know that in equilibrium, the typical household must choose a

= r LI ) .
consumption bundle along the horizontal line 2c-* B (recall that c *
2 0
2
2
, 0) and
Thus, i ' will be determined as the slope of the line through (r 1 E*
0
2

tangent to an indifference curve along the line 2c-* •s.
2

If the substitution

effect of the budget shift dominates the income effect, that tangency will
occur to the left of the point E, and foreign residents will give up some of
their previously planned consumption (c-* - c *' ).
1
1

They will withdraw less than

c*1 from the banking system, leaving foreign banks free to trade their excess
liquidity abroad for domestic securities.
previous example.

This was the case described in the
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If the income effect outweighs the substitutio n effect, however, a
tangency will occur along a budget line like line 3 at a point to the right of

E.

In this case, foreign households will try to consume more than is

available in period one.
be an equilibrium .

This implies that a budget line like line 3 cannot

Rather, perceiving that the banks are illiquid, the

typical foreign household would then run the foreign banks, forcing them also
to dump their securities and precluding any purchases of domestic bonds.
Thus, a run on the domestic banking system would be transmitted to the foreign
system.
To avoid this problem and yet benefit from the run on the domestic banks,
the foreign system could impose a withdrawal ceiling on its average depositor.
For example, a ceiling of DW* = c* - E, where Eis a small positive number,
1
would allow the foreign economy to consume at a point close to E, an
improvement in well-being for the typical depositor.
If restriction s on payments are not feasible, an alternative that will
prevent the run on foreign banks is to impose controls on capital exports.
Under an effective set of controls, foreign banks would not attempt to raise
liquid resources by raising the yield on deposits.

Depositors would then not

attempt to withdraw funds to increase their period one consumption plans.
Finally note that in this model, measures like deposit insurance are
ineffective in preventing the geographica l spreading of financial crises.

To

implement a deposit insurance scheme, a government would have in the
background a program to tax all withdrawals and asset holdings after a run to
make good depositor claims.

Since it cannot tax foreign holders of the dumped

securities, however, its promise to repay depositors is not credible.
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3.

Conclusions

In this paper we study banking crises in a world economy.

We show that a

country's welfare may be increased by the occurence of a financial crisis in
the rest of the world.

Thus, it may be rewarded for playing the role of

lender of last resort.
On the other hand, we also describe conditions under which

bank runs

"spread" internationally , thus propagating the disruptive effect of financial
collapses.
In a recent paper, Smith (1987) analyzes a different environment, which
also produces a geographical contagion of panics.

His model is based on the

existence of "reserve banks" which, by holding interbank deposits, provide the
link through which withdrawals of deposits are transmitted in the system.
In this paper, instead, we describe how the liquidation of long term
securities by the bank initially under stress, can be the triggering factor of
international panics.
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Figur e 1
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